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INTRODUCTION
International law derives from two primary sources: treaties and cus-
tomary international law (CIL).' The proper status of these two sources
in the U.S. legal system is among the persistent debates in contemporary
U.S. foreign relations law. In its past several terms, the U.S. Supreme
Court has had the opportunity to provide fresh guidance on both de-
bates. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court addressed a claim under
* Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. This Essay was con-
ceived and begun during my time as a Visiting Professor at George Washington University Law
School. I am grateful to George Washington Law for its generous financial support. I also thank
Ben Teich for his helpful research assistance. This Essay is dedicated to Christian Garry Moore.
1. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 (1987).
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the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)2-an act passed by the First Congress in
1789-for violation of a CIL prohibition on arbitrary detention. 3 In the
course of addressing the import of the ATS, the Court also spoke to the
domestic legal status of CIL. Much has been said about what Sosa
means both for the future of ATS litigation and for the domestic role of
GIL.4 This Essay does not reengage those questions.
Instead, this Essay focuses on the import of a more recent landmark
decision: Medellin v. Texas.5 In Medellin, the Supreme Court addressed
the domestic status of treaties in determining whether judgments of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) are judicially enforceable federal
law.6 Medellin represents the Court's most important pronouncement on
the domestic status of treaties in almost two hundred years. 7 Commenta-
tors have begun to sort out what the decision means for treaties in do-
mestic law, 8 but the import of the decision for ATS litigation and for the
domestic status of both CIL and international law more generally has
been neglected by the literature. This Essay fills that void. Part I ex-
plains how Medellin narrows prospects for both treaty- and CIL-based
claims under the ATS. Part II demonstrates that Medellin manifests the
same separation of powers perspective as Sosa, thus supporting the revi-
sionist position in the debate over the domestic status of CIL. Part III
identifies how Medellin contributes to the development of a uniform
doctrine governing the status of both treaties and CIL in the U.S. legal
system.
I. MEDELLIN AND ATS LITIGATION
A. Treaty Claims Under the ATS
The ATS vests federal district courts with "jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 9 The statute has provided the
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary Inter-
national Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); David H.
Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2006).
5. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
6. Id.
7. See Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Medellin: Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 550 (2008).
8. See, e.g., David Bederman et al., Agora: Medellin, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (2008).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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practical context in which the debate over CIL's domestic status has oc-
curred. The ATS and the Second Circuit decision that brought it out of
obscurity have generated a significant number of lawsuits based on vi-
olations of international law.'0 Most of these suits have dealt with viola-
tions of customary international law, but, because the ATS also provides
jurisdiction over claims based on treaty violations, various treaty-based
claims have also been raised.
For example, a dual citizen of Australia and the United Kingdom
who was convicted of drug crimes in the United States sued the Presi-
dent of the United States and other U.S. officials, claiming that their
failure to transfer him to the United Kingdom to complete his sentence
violated the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced
Persons." Finding no requirement to transfer in the treaty, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
claim.' 2 In another suit, the representative of a plane crash victim's es-
tate sued the plane's manufacturer and operator.' 3 The representative al-
leged a wrongful death claim pursuant to the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air
(Warsaw Convention), premising jurisdiction on the ATS. 14 Because
"[t]he [Warsaw] Convention itself does not seek to outlaw accidents,
crashes and other events causing death, injury or property loss," the
court concluded that the ATS did not confer jurisdiction.1 5 As a final
example, a Nigerian citizen convicted of drug crimes in the United
States sued various U.S. officials under the ATS for failure to notify
him of his right under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to
contact the Nigerian consulate.' 6 The court dismissed the claim based
on the plaintiffs failure to identify a tort committed in violation of the
Vienna Convention and on his failure to carry his burden as to causation
and damages.' 7 These decisions illustrate that there are numerous ob-
10. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Council
of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867,
1496 U.N.T.S. 92.
12. Bagguley, 953 F.2d at 663.
13. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1978).
14. Id. at 915-16; see also Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
15. Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 916.
16. Bieregu v. Ashcroft, 259 F. Supp. 2d 342, 345 (D.N.J. 2003); see also Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
17. Bieregu, 259 F. Supp. at 353-54.
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stacles to the successful prosecution of an ATS claim based on a treaty
violation, including the requirement that the claim sound in tort.' 8
The Court's decision in Medellin further obstructs ATS claims that
are grounded in treaty violations in at least two important ways. First,
Medellin adopts a broad view of treaty non-self-execution. To under-
stand the significance of this position, it is helpful to understand the
academic debate against which the decision occurred.
Scholars have long challenged the constitutionality of the non-self-
execution doctrine, though these challenges have been a matter of de-
gree. Despite sometimes broad language, scholars skeptical of non-self-
execution recognize that the doctrine may apply in limited circums-
tances. 19  For example, Professor Carlos Vdzquez asserts that
"[c]oncluding that the Constitution gives treaties, once made, 'automat-
ic' effect as domestic law requires only a reading of the Supremacy
Clause, which declares 'all' treaties to be the 'supreme Law of the
Land."' 20 At the same time, Vdizquez accepts (in light of Supreme Court
precedent) that treaty makers may overcome a presumption in favor of
self-execution by providing a clear statement of non-self-execution; by
crafting language that is vague or precatory; perhaps by entering a treaty
that addresses only state-to-state obligations or that speaks to non-
judicial branches of the government, as an arms control treaty might; or
by assuming obligations that violate Bill of Rights provisions or that re-
quire actions that are constitutionally committed to federal officials oth-
er than the treaty makers. 21 Vtizquez rejects the notion, however, that
the treaty makers can successfully express an intent to create a non-self-
executing agreement by something less than a clear statement.22
18. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 181 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that, under
the ATS, plaintiffs may bring claims "for torts committed in violation of a U.S. treaty," not for
mere "violation of a U.S. treaty" (emphasis in original)); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 712-14 (2004) (indicating that, in addition to the jurisdiction provided by the ATS, an
ATS plaintiff needs a cause of action).
19. Cf Carlos Manuel V~zquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2174 (1999)
(acknowledging that acceptance, based on Supreme Court caselaw, of some role for non-self-
execution "problematizes a literal interpretation of' the Supremacy Clause) [hereinafter VAzquez,
Laughing at Treaties].
20. Id. at 2156-57; see also id. at 2169, 2172.
21. Id. at 2174-75, 2177-82, 2186-88; Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:
The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 609,
630-31, 643, 694 (2008); Carlos Manuel VLquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individ-
uals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1140 (1992) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights].
22. See VAzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 19, at 2158 (attempting to reconcile Su-
preme Court non-self-execution cases with the text of the Supremacy Clause by "read[ing] the
Supremacy Clause as adopting a default rule that treaties have the force of domestic law, a rule
that may be reversed by the treatymakers through a clear statement in the treaty itself (or reserva-
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Professor Jordan Paust similarly asserts that "[t]he distinction found
in certain cases between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-executing' trea-
ties is a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with [the]
express language" of the Supremacy Clause.2 3 "[A]1l treaties, to the ex-
tent of their grants, guarantees or obligations, are self-executing." 24 At
the same time, Paust accepts that treaties may be non-self-executing if,
"by their terms considered in context, [they] require domestic imple-
menting legislation or seek to declare war on behalf of the United
States." 25
Like Vdzquez and Paust, Professor David Sloss reads the Supremacy
Clause as "mandat[ing] automatic conversion of treaties [into domestic
law] in most (but not all) cases. 26 Sloss acknowledges that "a treaty
provision has no domestic legal effect in the absence of implementing
legislation if it purports to accomplish something that, under our consti-
tutional system, requires legislation approved by both Houses of Con-
gress. 27 But, unlike Paust, Sloss perceives appropriation as such an
act.28 Sloss also recognizes that a treaty may be non-self-executing if it
is indeterminate or executory, creates only state-to-state obligations ra-
ther than obligations to private persons, or contravenes the constitution-
al rights of individuals or constitutionally-mandated principles of fede-
ralism.29 At the same time, Sloss concludes that, while treaty makers
tion thereto)").
23. JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (2d ed.
2003).
24. Id. at 75; see also id. at 69-70, 72 (discussing historical perspectives that support this po-
sition).
25. Id. at 80; see also id. at 70-72 (giving historical account of the domestic implementing
legislation exception to self-execution); id. at 76-78 (discussing the war power exception). This
does not mean, in Paust's view, that a treaty that "addresses an obligation of signatories to assure
that any necessary implementing legislation is forthcoming" is necessarily non-self-executing. Id.
at 91 n.98. The treaty may, for example, be non-self-executing in countries that do not recognize
self-execution but self-executing in countries that do not require implementing legislation. Id.
Similarly, this does not mean that Paust accepts unilateral declarations by the treaty makers that a
treaty is non-self-executing. See Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights
Treaties Are Law in the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 324-35 (1999).
26. David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1, 10 (2002) [hereinafter Sloss, Non-Self-Executing].
27. David Sloss, Schizophrenic Treaty Law, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 15, 17-18 (2007) [hereinafter
Sloss, Schizophrenic]; see also Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 26, at 30-31.
28. Sloss, Schizophrenic, supra note 27, at 18 n.13; see also The Federalist Society Online
Debate Series, Medellin v. Texas: Part I: Self-Execution (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.fed-soc.org/
debates/dbtid. 17/default.asp [hereinafter Federalist Society Debate] (featuring a debate between
David Sloss, Ted Cruz, Nick Rozenkranz, and Edwin Williamson).
29. Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 26, at 28-31; see also Federalist Society Debate,
supra note 28.
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may prevent treaty enforcement by plaintiffs, they may not prevent, by
their mere intent, a treaty from becoming primary domestic law that
may be invoked defensively if the treaty "create[s] primary international
legal duties binding on the United States." 30 Sloss thus rejects the view
that, "if implementing legislation is not constitutionally required... ,
the treaty makers ... can preclude a treaty from having domestic legal
status... by manifesting their intention to do so."
3
'
Despite these varied academic efforts to narrow non-self-execution,
the Medellin Court adopted a fairly expansive view of the doctrine. No
member of the Court suggested that all treaties-or even all treaties not
contemplating action that is constitutionally assigned to federal actors
other than the treaty makers-are self-executing. In dissent, Justice
Breyer endorsed the narrowest view of the non-self-execution doctrine,
but even he recognized that treaties may be non-self-executing under
certain circumstances. 32 To him, the critical question (answered largely
by the Supremacy Clause),33 was whether a treaty "'addresses itself to
the political ... department[s]' for further action or to 'the judicial de-
partment' for direct enforcement." 34 To Justice Breyer, the answer to
this question depends not on whether and how the treaty addresses the
self-execution question, 35 but on "practical, context-specific" criteria,
including text, drafting history, subject matter, whether enforcement of
the treaty would "engender constitutional controversy," and whether the
treaty provides definite legal standards or requires the creation of a new
cause of action.36 Under this approach, treaties addressing war and
peace, for example, would be non-self-executing because they are ad-
dressed to the political branches.
37
Justice Breyer thus acknowledges a role for non-self-execution, albeit
(compared to the majority) a modest one. Moreover, given his focus on
the objective, contextual character of the treaty (as one addressed to ei-
30. Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 26, at 46; see also id. at 43-70.
3 1. Sloss, Schizophrenic, supra note 27, at 18; cf Federalist Society Debate, supra note 28
(noting that the Constitution, not the treatymakers' intent, governs the question of whether a trea-
ty is federal law).
32. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375-92 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 1346, 1375-81, 1389; see also David H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The
Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32,43-44 (2009).
34. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1828)); see also id. at 1382-85, 1392.
35. See id. at 1380-82.
36. Id. at 1382; see also id. at 1385-89 (introducing additional considerations in answering
the self-execution question in Medellin).
37. Id. at 1382, 1388.
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ther the political branches or the courts) and the multivariate nature of
his analysis, Justice Breyer arguably gives the judiciary greater discre-
tion than does the majority with regard to the domestic status of treaties,
including the discretion to categorize the same treaty differently in dif-
ferent contexts.
38
The majority found that a greater range of treaties would be non-self-
executing.39 In particular, it endorsed the notion that a treaty may be
non-self-executing if the treaty makers so intended.40 Moreover, while
the Court did not explicitly announce a presumption that treaties are
non-self-executing, its self-execution analysis includes considerations
that will likely lead lower courts to classify treaties as non-self-
executing more frequently.4' For example, the majority considered the
practical consequences of concluding that ICJ judgments are unassaila-
ble federal law under the relevant treaties.42 Such a conclusion would
threaten preemption of both state and federal law and create the possi-
bility of domestically unreviewable ICJ orders that set aside domestic
convictions and sentences.43 As discussed more fully below,44 this and
other considerations on which the Court relied reflect a separation of
powers vision under which courts should be reluctant to displace the
primary domestic lawmakers and conductors of foreign affairs. 45 This
limitation on the judiciary's role means that fewer treaties will be
deemed self-executing.
If a treaty is non-self-executing, it is, at a minimum, not judicially en-
forceable even in a court that possesses jurisdiction to hear treaty
claims. 46 As a result, violation of a non-self-executing treaty cannot give
38. See id. at 1385 (suggesting that, pursuant to the same treaty obligations, some ICJ judg-
ments might be self-executing and others not).
39. See id. at 1361-65 (majority opinion).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 98-103 (discussing the majority's emphasis on the
treaty makers' intent).
41. See Moore, supra note 33, at 46.
42. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1364.
43. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 98-130.
45. See Moore, supra note 33, at 45.
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3) (1987). The conventional wisdom, as reflected in the Restatement of U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions Law, has been that "international agreements of the United States are law of the United
States" and that non-self-executing agreements are judicially unenforceable absent congressional
implementation. Id. § 111(1); see also id. § 111(3). Medellin introduces ambiguity regarding
whether non-self-execution means something more: that a non-self-executing treaty is not domes-
tic law. Compare, e.g., Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1365 ("[T]he particular treaty obligations on which
Medellin relies do not of their own force create domestic law."), and id. at 1369 ("[A] non-self-
executing treaty can become domestic law only" by act of Congress.), with id. at 1356 n.2 ("What
2010]
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rise to an ATS claim. In Sosa, plaintiff Alvarez-Machain cited the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to support his
arbitrary detention claim.47 The Court noted that the ICCPR was "rati-
fied.., on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and
so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.
48
The Court thus concluded that the ICCPR could not "establish the rele-
vant and applicable rule of international law" on which Alvarez-
Machain sought to rely.49 Because a non-self-executing treaty like the
ICCPR cannot itself support an ATS claim, Medellin's broad notion of
non-self-execution limits the range of potentially successful treaty
claims under the ATS.
Medellin directly limits treaty-based ATS claims in another respect:
Even when the relevant treaty is self-executing, a private plaintiff may
not sue for a treaty violation in the absence of a cause of action. The
Medellin Court endorsed a presumption, adopted by several circuits,
"that '[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private
persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private
cause of action in domestic courts.,, 50 The dissent was similarly wary of
judicial creation of treaty-based causes of action.5'
The conclusion that treaties themselves do not generally create pri-
vate rights of action would not obstruct treaty-based suits if the ATS
created, or authorized federal courts to create, a cause of action for vi-
olations of international agreements. However, in Sosa, the Supreme
Court concluded that the ATS is merely jurisdictional.52 There was no
we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification. Conversely, a 'non-self-executing' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically
enforceable federal law."), and id. at 1369 (describing execution as rendering a treaty "binding on
domestic courts"). For further discussion of the meaning of non-self-execution, see Bradley, su-
pra note 7, at 541, 547-50 (discussing the ambiguity in Medellin regarding the effect of non-self-
execution); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SuP. CT. R. 131, 174-75
(same); ABA/ASIL Joint Task Force on Treaties in U.S. Law, Report 10-12 (Mar. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf (same); Nicholas Quinn Ro-
senkranz, Non-Self-Execution and the Supreme Law of the Land 2 (2008) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) ("The Medellin Court pretty clearly endorsed the position that non-
self-executing treaties are not domestic rules of law at all."). But cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (indicating that when a treaty is "not self-executing" it does "not itself
create obligations enforceable in the federal courts").
47. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734.
48. Id. at 735.
49. Id.
50. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987)).
51. See id. at 1382, 1388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713-14.
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suggestion that the Court's conclusion would be different for the portion
of the ATS addressing jurisdiction over treaty claims. The treaty provi-
sion of the ATS is but a clause in the same sentence addressing jurisdic-
tion over CIL-based claims.53 Furthermore, the reasons the Court gave
for finding the ATS to be jurisdictional apply equally in the treaty con-
text: namely, (a) that the ATS originally "gave the district courts 'cog-
nizance' of certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of ju-
risdiction, not power to mold substantive law"; (b) that the ATS was
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which otherwise solely addressed ju-
risdiction; and (c) that the drafters and enactors of the ATS understood
"the distinction between jurisdiction and cause of action. 54
The jurisdictional finding in Sosa did not completely preclude federal
courts from creating causes of action for some international law viola-
tions. After holding that the ATS was jurisdictional, the Court found
that the intent of the enacting Congress gave rise to limited, residual au-
thority for the federal courts to recognize causes of action based on
GIL.55 The Court reasoned that the First Congress expected that certain
claims based on the law of nations, "admitting of a judicial remedy,"
could be prosecuted in the federal courts pursuant to ATS jurisdiction.56
But the claims were few, given the recognition at the time that "'of-
fenses against [the] law [of nations] are principally incident to whole
states or nations,' and not individuals seeking relief in court., 57 Presum-
ably, Congress also thought that treaties-to the extent they transcended
state-to-state rights and duties-would be enforced under the ATS only
if the treaties themselves created a private right of action.5" Medellin, of
course, endorses the presumption that treaties do not create rights of ac-
tion.59 Plaintiffs seeking to rectify treaty violations through the ATS
must either overcome this presumption or identify a cause of action in
some other source. 60 The difficulty of establishing a cause of action, in
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
54. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
55. See id. at 724-25.
56. Id. at 715; see also id. at 719-20.
57. Id. at 720 (quoting 4 WILLtAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68).
58. As "there is no record even of debate on the" ATS, one can only surmise what Congress
intended based on the historical context and motivation for enacting the statute. Sosa, 542 U.S. at
718.
59. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.3 (2008).
60. Private rights of action to address treaty violations might be available through other ve-
hicles, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006), or habeas review, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2006), though claims under these vehicles
would not need to rely on the ATS's jurisdictional grant. See Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, su-
pra note 19, at 2182-83, 2196-98; Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 21, at 1134, 1143-
2010]
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conjunction with the requirement that the treaty violated be self-
executing, significantly hinders treaty-based ATS claims.
B. Customary International Law Claims Under the ATS
As treaty claims under the ATS are relatively rare and face signifi-
cant hurdles, Medellin's limitations on such claims have a limited prac-
tical impact. However, Medellin's approach to treaty self-execution is
also relevant to ATS claims based on CIL. These claims are far more
common than claims based on treaties. For example, in the seminal case
of Kadic v. Karadzic, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully
stated individual-capacity claims of genocide and war crimes against the
defendant, the commander of Bosnian-Serb military forces and "the
President of a three-man presidency of [a] self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb
republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina., 6 1 Similarly, in the significant
case of Doe v. Unocal, Burmese villagers sued various oil companies
for "directly or indirectly subject[ing] the villagers to forced labor, mur-
der, rape, and torture" in the construction of a gas pipeline in Burma.62
Other suits against corporations have addressed, inter alia, violations of
the rights to life, health, and sustainable development caused by intrater-
ritorial pollution from mining-related activities, 63 and violations based
on the administration of experimental medicine without obtaining in-
formed consent. 64 Aliens have also sued U.S. officials and contractors
for violations of CIL in the conduct of the war on terrorism. Plaintiffs
have sued, for example, for prolonged arbitrary detention and cruel, in-
human, and degrading treatment resulting from the Central Intelligence
Agency's extraordinary rendition practices. 65
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain also involved a CIL-based claim. The plain-
tiff, Alvarez-Machain, was kidnapped in Mexico by Mexican nationals
pursuant to a plan approved by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. 66
He then sued under the ATS, claiming (as the Court perceived it)67 vi-
54; John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and § 1983 After Medellin v. Texas, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 35 (2009).
61. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995); see id. at 241-43.
62. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002), rehearing en banc granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cit. 2003), appeal dismissed and district court opinion vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th
Cir. 2005).
63. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2003).
64. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 F. App'x 48, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2003).
65. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299-301 (4th Cir. 2007).
66. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
67. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2241,
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olation of a CIL norm against "'arbitrary' detention defined as officially
sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the
domestic law of some government." 68 Alvarez-Machain relied on the
ICCPR as evidence that CIL embraced the alleged norm.69 The Court,
however, concluded that, even if Alvarez-Machain's assertion were "an
accurate reading of the [ICCPR]," he had mustered "little authority that
a rule so broad has the status of a binding customary norm today. °70 The
Court thus discounted the evidentiary value of non-self-executing trea-
ties in the identification of actionable norms of CIL.7'
Medellin took the next step toward limiting CIL-based ATS claims.72
By giving the doctrine of non-self-execution a broader scope than its
critics would afford,73 the Court increased the number of treaties that
might be classified as non-self-executing. Because Sosa discounted the
evidentiary value of non-self-executing treaties in establishing CIL
claims, Medellin thinned the evidence available to plaintiffs seeking to
recover under the ATS for violations of CIL.
1I. MEDELLIN AND THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to limiting ATS claims based on treaty and CIL viola-
tions, Medellin bears on the broader and more significant question of
CIL's domestic legal status. This issue has split scholars into two fac-
tions: a modernist camp and a revisionist camp.74 Modernists maintain
that CIL is federal common law that federal courts may apply in the ab-
sence of positive authorization; revisionists argue that either the politi-
2253, 2281-82 (2004) (noting the Court's cramped conception of Alvarez-Machain's claim).
68. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736.
69. Id. at 734-35.
70. Id.
71. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 4, at 899-901. The Court's position on the
evidentiary value of non-self-executing treaties was not without ambiguity. See id. at 901.
72. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 98-130.
74. The debate between the camps was largely framed by Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997), and Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998), though many entered the fray. See, e.g., Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393
(1997).
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cal branches or the Constitution must authorize federal judicial reliance
on CIL as a domestic rule of decision.75 Although both camps purported
to find an endorsement of their position in Sosa,7 6 Medellin tips the
scale toward the revisionist position by displaying the same separation
of powers vision that revisionists perceived in Sosa.
The separation of powers perspective underlying Sosa is apparent in
the considerations that the Sosa Court identified to guide lower courts in
recognizing causes of action based on CIL. 77 Primary among these con-
siderations was the intent of the political branches. 78 It was the intent of
the First Congress that led to recognition of some residual judicial au-
thority to recognize CIL-based claims, 79 just as it was the First Con-
gress's intent (as well as the absence of broader intent in subsequent
Congresses) that limited the scope of that residual authority. Thus, fed-
eral courts may only recognize claims for violations of customary inter-
national law norms as specifically defined and widely accepted as the
CIL norms Congress presumably had in mind in enacting the ATS.8 °
The requirements of specific definition and wide acceptance,
grounded as they are in congressional intent, reflect a separation of
powers vision in which authority to make domestic law based on CIL
derives from the primary federal lawmaker--Congress. The require-
ments confirm that vision by communicating the sense that federal
courts should not fill otherwise vague CIL norms with specific content,
particularly where doing so would have significant foreign policy impli-
cations or would commit the United States to CIL obligations that other
states have not assumed.'
Although the specific-definition and mutuality requirements played
the dominant role in Sosa, the Supreme Court's separation of powers vi-
sion appeared in other considerations as well. In connection with the
75. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 74, at 816-17, 870.
76. Compare, e.g., Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 4, at 873, 902-10, and Moore,
supra note 4, at 8, 48-49, with Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations
Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004), and Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term:
The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2004).
Others concluded that Sosa said much less than either side claimed. See Julian Ku, A No Deci-
sion: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Debate Over the Domestic Status of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 267,267-69 (2007).
77. For a more detailed discussion of these considerations, see Moore, supra note 4, at 31-38.
78. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-25 (2004).
79. See id. at 714-25; see also id. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("The Court would
apparently find authorization [for continued judicial recognition of some CIL-based claims] in the
understanding of the Congress that enacted the ATS .....
80. See id. at 725, 731-32 (majority opinion).
8 1. See infra text accompanying notes 86-96.
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specific-definition requirement, the Court instructed lower courts to
ponder the practical consequences of recognizing a particular cause of
action.82 Recognition of Alvarez-Machain's claim of "officially sanc-
tioned detention exceeding positive authorization to detain under the
domestic law of some government" would open federal courts to, inter
alia, claims "for any arrest, anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the
law of the jurisdiction in which it took place., 83 Federal judicial authori-
ty is too circumscribed to support generation of such consequences. Fur-
ther, the Court counseled "deference to the political branches" in appro-
priate cases, such as class action litigation against companies that
transacted with the South African apartheid regime-litigation that
South Africa and the United States agreed would undercut the South
African government's policy of dealing with apartheid through truth and
reconciliation. 84 Finally, the Court noted that it would recognize an in-
ternational law requirement of exhaustion of remedies in certain cases.
85
These additional considerations reveal a separation of powers vision
that leaves primary responsibility for lawmaking and foreign affairs to
the political branches rather than the courts.
This separation of powers vision is also manifest in the Sosa Court's
comments on the limited role of the federal judiciary-comments that
motivated, at a minimum, the specific-definition and mutuality consid-
erations discussed above.86 As the Court explained, "there are good rea-
sons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should
exercise in considering a new cause of action" based on CIL.87 It is now
generally understood that common law is made, not found or discov-
ered, as was thought under the Swift v. Tyson regime. 88 In light of Erie
82. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33, 736-37.
83. Id. at 736; see also id. at 737.
84. Id. at 733 n.21. The Second Circuit allowed consolidated apartheid litigation to go for-
ward on the ground that the ATS accommodated claims of aiding and abetting liability. Khulu-
mani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The court of ap-
peals left to the district court the task of determining whether deference to the executive required
dismissal. Id. at 260-61. Interestingly, on petition for certiorari, recusals left the Supreme Court
without the required quorum of six, causing the Court to affirm the Second Circuit's decision pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006). See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424
(2008). On remand, the district court concluded that deference to the executive did not require
dismissal of plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 228, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
85. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
86. See id. at 725, 727-28.
87. Id. at 725.
88. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 7 (1842); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
2010]
498 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,89 federal courts have a limited role in making
common law. Federal courts generally "look for legislative guidance be-
fore exercising innovative authority over substantive law"90 and leave
the "decision to create a private right of action ... to legislative judg-
ment in the great majority of cases." 91 This deference to the legislature
extends to cases involving CIL, although "the absence of congressional
action addressing private rights of action under an international norm is
more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it creates a
statute. 92
Not only should the federal courts hesitate to infringe on the political
branches' lawmaking authority, they should also be "wary of impinging
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs." 93 Making common law based on CIL risks such im-
pingement because CIL-based claims can involve U.S. courts in the sen-
sitive task of assessing the international legality of foreign sovereigns'
actions toward their own citizens. 94 Had Congress authorized broad rec-
ognition of common law claims based on CIL, the Court's concerns for
overstepping the federal judiciary's role in lawmaking and foreign af-
fairs would be mitigated. 95 But in the ATS context there is "no congres-
sional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of
the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understand-
ing of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged
greater judicial creativity." 96 Thus, in keeping with Sosa's separation of
powers vision, federal courts should be wary of recognizing ATS claims
based on CIL.
Medellin is grounded in the same view of separation of powers. The
Medellin Court was required to consider whether U.S. treaty obligations
with regard to the International Court of Justice were self-executing in
order to decide if the ICJ's decision in Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals97 was automatically enforceable federal law.
89. 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
90. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
91. Id. at 727.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Consistent with this principle, the Sosa Court "welcome[d] any congressional guidance in
exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations." Id. at 731.
96. Id. at 728.
97. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31). The ICJ held in Avena that certain Mexican nationals, including Medellin, who were
arrested and convicted in the United States without being informed of their Vienna Convention
[Vol. 50:2
2010] MEDELLIN AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 499
The factors that informed the Court's self-execution analysis disclose a
separation of powers perspective similar to the one underlying Sosa.
Although the Court's opinion is not without ambiguity, the primary
consideration guiding the Court's self-execution analysis is the intent of
the political branches-specifically, the intent of the President and Se-
nate that adopted the treaty obligation. 98 After a lengthy analysis, the
Court concluded that "[n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and
drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the
President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judg-
ments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by
'many of our most fundamental constitutional protections."' 9 9 As in So-
sa, the Court indicated in Medellin that the political branches control the
extent to which treaties are judicially enforceable domestic law.
In ascertaining the intent of the political branches, the Court first re-
lied on the text of the relevant treaties: the UN Charter, the Statute of
the ICJ, and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations (Protocol). 100 The Protocol, the Court reasoned, addressed
jurisdiction, not the binding effect of ICJ judgments.' 0 ' "The obliga-
tion.., to comply with ICJ judgments" was derived from the UN Char-
right to notify their consulate were entitled to review and reconsideration of their convictions and
sentences. See id. at 73.
98. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (stating that a treaty is self-executing
if it "conveys an intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on those terms") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir.
2005) (en banc)); id. at 1358 (finding that the UN Charter obligation under which each state "un-
dertakes to comply" with ICJ decisions does not "indicate that the Senate that ratified the U.N.
Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts") (emphasis
omitted); id. at 1359 (reasoning-based on statements from the executive-that "the President
and Senate were undoubtedly aware" in ratifying the UN Charter that the United States could veto
Security Council attempts to enforce ICJ judgments against the United States); id. at 1360 ("[T]he
Executive and ratifying Senate" always regarded a Security Council veto "as an option ... during
and after consideration of the U.N. Charter, Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute .... [T]here is no
reason to believe that the President and Senate signed up for" a regime of automatic enforcement
in domestic courts that would undermine the veto option.); id. at 1362 (defending reliance on trea-
ties' text on the grounds that the text "is ... what the Senate looks to in deciding whether to ap-
prove the treaty"); id. at 1364 ("[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual pro-
visions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic
effect."); id. at 1366 ("Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty's terms reflect a
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty
has domestic effect."). See also Bradley, supra note 7, at 543-45. But cf Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at
1362 (interpreting the Supreme Court's early self-execution decision in United States v. Perche-
man, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), as relying on "the parties' intent" rather than the U.S. treaty
makers' intent).
99. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367.
100. Id. at 1357; see also id. at 1364-65.
101. Id. at 1358.
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ter, which requires that member states "undertake[] to comply with" ICJ
decisions in cases to which they are party.10 2 This language, with its ab-
sence of specific imperatives, contemplates future steps to comply with
ICJ judgments rather than an intent on behalf of the treaty makers to
render such judgments immediately enforceable in U.S. courts. 10 3
What sort of language would be required to establish self-execution?
Justice Breyer wrote in his dissenting opinion that the majority imposed
a clear-statement obligation on treaty makers who wish to produce a
self-executing treaty. 10 4 There is certainly language in the majority opi-
nion to support such a reading. Citing "general principles of interpreta-
tion," the Court explained "that 'absent a clear and express statement to
the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the imple-
mentation of the treaty in that State."' 10 5 Similarly, the Court stated that
the executive may create a self-executing treaty "by ensuring that [the
treaty] contains language plainly providing for domestic enforceability,"
but "[o]nce a treaty is ratified without provisions clearly according it
domestic effect," Congress must decide whether the treaty will have
domestic effect. 10 6 At the same time, the Court rejected "the dissent's
suggestion ... [that its] approach [or its] cases require that a treaty pro-
vide for self-execution in so many talismanic words."'10 7 To the extent
the dissent is correct that the majority imposed a clear statement rule or
at least favored a clear statement, the Court certainly narrowed the judi-
cial role in treaty enforcement. Even if the Court adopted something less
than a clear statement requirement, its attempt to discern the treaty mak-
ers' intent from the treaty text places control over the self-execution
question principally in the political branches.
In addition to its reliance on the text of the treaties, the Court consi-
dered alternatives to enforcement in U.S. courts.'0 8 The UN Charter
provides for referral to the Security Council in the event of noncom-
pliance with an ICJ judgment.'0 9 The existence of an alternative remedy
102. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1).
103. Id. at 1358; see also id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he words
'undertakes to comply' . . . are most naturally read as a promise to take additional steps to enforce
ICJ judgments.").
104. Id. at 1380-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1363 (majority opinion) (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 351
(2006)).
106. Id. at 1369.
107. Id. at 1366.
108. Id. at 1359.
109. Id.; see U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
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counsels against automatic judicial enforcement,11 ° particularly when
the remedy provided is contingent and diplomatic, not judicial."' The
existence of such a remedy is especially significant where the President
and Senate, in ratifying the relevant treaties, fully understood that "the
United States retained the unqualified right to" veto attempts at en-
forcement through the Security Council, leaving "no reason to believe
that" they signed up for domestic judicial enforcement that would un-
dermine the veto option." 2
The Court's reliance on the Security Council alternative to judicial
enforcement manifests a desire to avoid undermining the political
branches' foreign policy discretion. The UN Charter acknowledges that
states will have to make decisions regarding compliance." 3 The Court
recognized that the political branches, not the courts, should make the
delicate decision "whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment,"
particularly since the Constitution commits the conduct of U.S. foreign
affairs to the President and Congress.' 14 The Court was also sensitive to
the political branches' lead role in foreign affairs in recognizing that the
executive's consistent interpretation of the relevant treaty obligations as
non-self-executing "is entitled to great weight."'"
15
The Court further protected the political branches' foreign affairs au-
thority by rejecting Justice Breyer's expansive view of self-execution.
According to the majority, Justice Breyer's multivariate approach would
permit the judiciary to "pick and choose which [treaties] shall be bind-
ing United States law ... and which shall not." 116 Under this analysis,
"the same treaty sometimes gives rise to United States law and some-
times does not, .. . depending on an ad hoc judicial assessment.""' 7 The
Constitution's assignment of the power to create treaties, including trea-
ties that qualify as federal law, to the political branches excludes the
role Justice Breyer assigns to the judiciary." 8 Justice Breyer's approach
"is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interp-
ret but also to create the law."' ' 9
110. See Moore, supra note 4, at 45-46.
111. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1359.
112. Id. at 1359-60.
113. Id. at 1360; see also U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3; id. art. 94, para. 2.
114. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1360.
115. Id. at 1361 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85
(1982)).
116. Id. at 1362.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1363.
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Moreover, Justice Breyer's approach risks negative foreign policy
consequences, as the United States and other countries would be hesi-
tant to "enter into treaties that are sometimes enforceable and sometimes
not," treaties that would, in essence, give "a blank check to the judi-
ciary.' ' 2 ° Justice Breyer countered that the Court's approach would
have serious foreign policy consequences, as it would call into question
compromissary clauses in many existing U.S. treaties.1 21 The Court,
however, dismissed this argument on four grounds: (a) other compro-
missary clauses may produce ICJ judgments with immediate domestic
effect; (b) those compromissary clauses that do not afford ICJ judg-
ments immediate domestic effect still give rise to international obliga-
tions that may generate diplomatic remedies; (c) the underlying treaty
on which the judgment was based may be self-executing; and (d) Con-
gress is competent to execute non-self-executing obligations.' 22 In short,
the Court's concern for both the foreign affairs discretion of the political
branches and U.S. relations with other countries supported the conclu-
sion that the relevant treaty obligations were not self-executing.
The Court also concluded that the non-self-executing character of the
treaty obligations at issue in Medellin was "confirmed by the 'postratifi-
cation understanding' of signatory nations."'' 23 "[T]he lack of any basis
for supposing that any other country would treat ICJ judgments as di-
rectly enforceable as a matter of their domestic law" led the Court to
conclude "that the treaty should not be so viewed in our courts. ' 12 4 Be-
cause other nations had not assumed such an obligation, the Court con-
cluded that it should not assume a unilateral obligation to that effect on
behalf of the United States. 125
The potential consequences of concluding that the treaty obligations
in Medellin were self-executing likewise supported the Court's non-self-
execution holding. If ICJ judgments were unassailable federal law, they
could not only override both state and federal law, but also prevent fed-
eral or state courts from evaluating ICJ orders that went so far as to "an-
nul criminal convictions and sentences, for any reason deemed suffi-
120. Id. at 1362.
121. Id. at 1387-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1365-66 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 1363.
124. Id.
125. See id. The Court also considered evidence that the ICJ itself does not "view[] its judg-
ments as automatically enforceable in the domestic courts of signatory nations." Id. at 1361 n.9.
However, this consideration was mentioned only in a footnote.
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cient by the ICJ. ' 126 Even the dissent was unwilling to treat all ICJ
judgments-for example, "politically sensitive judgments"-as self-
executing.
127
Like the analysis in Sosa, Medellin's self-execution analysis reflects
a limited role for the judiciary in domestic lawmaking and foreign af-
fairs. The Medellin Court explicitly relied on the Constitution's delega-
tion of the conduct of foreign affairs to the political departments in con-
cluding that the relevant treaties did not give rise to self-executing obli-
obligations. 128 In response to Justice Breyer's dissent, the Court criti-
cized a conception of the self-execution doctrine that gave too much
discretion to the judiciary at the expense of the political branches. 129
The Court concluded that Congress and the executive-not the federal
judiciary-should have "the primary role in deciding when and how in-
ternational agreements will be enforced."
'1 30
The Medellin Court's reliance on the separation of lawmaking and
foreign affairs powers, paralleling the Court's vision in Sosa, lends sup-
port to the revisionist perspective on CIL's domestic legal status. Me-
dellin also supports the revisionist viewpoint in at least two other ways.
First, one might attack the revisionist reading of Sosa by arguing that
Sosa perceives CIL as a body of U.S. law and deals solely with whether
CIL may be fitted to a cause of action. 13' I, along with Professors Jack
Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley, have previously explained why Sosa
should be read as addressing the incorporation of CIL into U.S. law.
32
Medellin lends additional support to the dualist position that CIL is out-
side U.S. law, not merely a body of U.S. law that may not readily be fit-
ted to a cause of action. The Medellin Court repeatedly suggested that
non-self-executing treaties are not domestic law, rather than domestic
law that is merely judicially unenforceable. 133 Similarly, Justice Breyer
126. Id. at 1364.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1360.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
130. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363; see also id. at 1364 (reasoning that if Congress intended
that "some politically sensitive [ICJ] judgments" be non-self-executing, "the judiciary should [not
be the branch of government to] decide which judgments are politically sensitive and which are
not"). But cf id. at 1365 (asserting that whether a treaty is self-executing "is, of course, a matter
for this Court to decide").
131. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 4, at 909.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 ("[W]hile treaties 'may comprise international
commitments ... they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing sta-
tutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is ratified on these
terms."' (quoting Igartua-De la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
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explained that, as a result of the Supremacy Clause, "treaty provisions
that bind the United States may... also enter domestic law without fur-
ther congressional action and automatically bind the States and courts as
well." 134 While these references may merely be shorthand for describing
domestic law that is not judicially enforceable, they may also suggest
that the Court intuits that international law is a body of law outside the
domestic system.
Second, even if the Court perceives non-self-executing treaties and
CIL as some form of judicially unenforceable domestic law, it appears
that at least one of its members contemplates a more limited role for
CIL than for treaties. Justice Breyer-one of the Court's more transna-
tionalist justices--did not reject non-self-execution in Medellin, but ra-
ther perceived it as having a more limited application than the majority
allowed. Under Justice Breyer's approach, more treaties, including the
treaties at issue in Medellin,135 would be self-executing and therefore
enforceable by U.S. courts. By contrast, in his concurrence in Sosa, Jus-
tice Breyer argued for a limit on the incorporation of CIL beyond the
limits the majority recognized. 136 While endorsing considerations of
specific definition, wide acceptance, deference to the executive, and al-
ternative means of enforcement, Justice Breyer was also concerned that
"the exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS . . . [be] consistent with
those notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign
rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its laws and their en-
forcement."' 137 Consequently, in deciding whether to exercise jurisdic-
banc))); id. at 1365 ("[T]he particular treaty obligations on which Medellin relies do not of their
own force create domestic law."); id. at 1365 (noting that international judgments may be valua-
ble even if they do "not automatically become domestic law"); id. at 1367 ("In sum, while the
ICJ's judgment in A vena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it
does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state [law]."); id. at 1369
("[A] non-self-executing treaty can become domestic law only [by act of Congress]."); id. at 1370
(referring to "the President's asserted authority to create domestic law pursuant to a non-self-
executing treaty" and to "transforming an international obligation into domestic law"); id. at 1371
(referring both to giving "the ICJ's decision in Avena the force of domestic law" and to creating
domestic law); id. at 1372 ("[T]he Avena judgment is not domestic law."); id. at 1374 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the Avena judgment "constitutes an international
law obligation" even though it "is not 'the supreme Law of the Land' (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2)).
134. Id. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1390 (describing the
majority as holding "that the Nation's international legal obligation to enforce the ICJ's decision
is not automatically a domestic legal obligation").
135. Id. at 1376.
136. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760-61 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
137. Id. at 761. One might argue that Justice Breyer thought this consideration peculiar to
ATS litigation. But to reach this conclusion one would have to begin with the counterfactual pre-
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tion over claims by foreign nationals who are injured abroad by foreign
conduct, Justice Breyer would consider whether there is a "procedural
consensus" that the conduct in question warrants universal jurisdic-
tion-that is, authorization for any state to exercise jurisdiction to pros-
ecute the conduct. 138 If such a consensus exists, then principles of comi-
ty are not threatened and adjudication of a CIL-based claim is appropri-
appropriate.1 39 The important point, however, is that Justice Breyer saw
a more limited domestic role for CIL than did the Sosa majority, but he
favored a broader role for treaties than did the majority in Medellin. Jus-
tice Breyer, at least, would seem to appreciate the revisionist position
that CIL's domestic status should be more circumscribed than that of
treaties because treaties are formally negotiated and approved by the po-
litical branches and are specifically included in the Supremacy Clause's
catalogue of supreme federal law. 140
III. MEDELLIN AND DEVELOPING UNIFORMITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The Supreme Court's treatment of CIL in Sosa and treaties in Me-
dellin likely results in a greater domestic role for treaties than for CIL.
To the extent that uniform considerations, particularly political branch
intent and specific definition, govern questions of both treaty self-
execution and CIL incorporation, treaties are likely to enjoy a broader
role in the U.S. legal system than CIL. 4 ' Treaties themselves provide
evidence of the political branches' intent, and they contain written obli-
gations that a court can evaluate for specific definition. 14
2
Medellin supports the claim that a uniform doctrine governs the do-
mestic status of both treaties and CIL. I previously argued, in light of
Sosa's treatment of customary international law, that a doctrinal un-
iformity was emerging. 43 That argument, however, relied on self-
execution considerations that were pieced together from Supreme Court
mise that the ATS was designed to limit federal judicial authority to hear CIL-based claims and
proceed to assume that Justice Breyer was unwilling to consider the plaintiff's claim outside the
confines of the ATS. See David H. Moore, Setting the Record Straight: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and the Debate over Customary International Law 10 (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 154, 2009), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090820-Chapter4.pdf.
138. Sosa, 542 U.S at 761-63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
139. Id. at 762.
140. See Moore, supra note 4, at 51.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
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and circuit court decisions. 44 The Supreme Court had not previously
provided extensive guidance on the content of the self-execution analy-
sis. Medellin changed that: Medellin paints the fullest picture of the fac-
tors governing self-execution to date.
As the discussion above details, the primary consideration governing
self-execution is the intent of the political branches. Specific definition,
mutuality, practical consequences, foreign relations effects, and alterna-
tive means of enforcement contribute to the inquiry. A court is more
likely to conclude that a treaty is self-executing if there is evidence that
the political branches intended the treaty to be self-executing. That in-
tent can be located in treaty text that imposes specifically defined obli-
gations that reflect judicially enforceable standards. On the other hand, a
treaty is less likely to be deemed self-executing if: (a) other states party
to the treaty have not assumed a self-executing obligation; 145 (b) the
practical consequences of a self-executing classification are sweeping or
otherwise give pause; 146 (c) self-execution would produce untoward for-
eign affairs effects, including disruption of relations with other countries
or constriction of the foreign affairs discretion of the political
branches; 147 or (d) the treaty contemplates alternative means of en-
forcement. 14
8
These factors parallel the considerations that the Supreme Court laid
down in Sosa to guide the incorporation of norms of customary interna-
tional law. As noted above, the Sosa Court focused on the intent of the
political branches (specifically, the First Congress) to identify the
source and scope of federal judicial authority to incorporate CIL norms.
It sought norms of CIL that were specifically defined and well accepted
by other states, unlike Alvarez-Machain's claim based on an abstract
prohibition on arbitrary detention. The Court also considered the prac-
tical consequences and foreign relations effects of creating a CIL-based
144. Id. at 10-11.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25 (highlighting the Medellin Court's observa-
tion that other states do not treat ICJ judgments as immediately enforceable in domestic courts).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27 (noting the Medellin Court's apprehension
that self-execution could give rise to unassailable ICJ judgments that preempt state and federal
law and overturn criminal convictions).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 113-19 (discussing the Medellin Court's observation
that self-execution would, inter alia, eliminate the political branches' discretion to decide "wheth-
er and how to comply with" ICJ judgments); supra text accompanying notes 120-22 (outlining
the Medellin Court's concern that states would be hesitant to enter treaties if the judiciary pos-
sessed significant discretion to decide if and when treaties are self-executing).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14 (discussing the Medellin Court's reliance on
the contingent and political enforcement of ICJ judgments in the Security Council).
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cause of action, including opening the flood gates to alien claims based
on unauthorized detention and eclipsing political branch authority over
foreign affairs by creating problems with other states. Finally, the Sosa
Court expressed willingness to consider alternative means of enforce-
ment, such as exhaustion of local remedies.
The confluence of considerations in Medellin and Sosa not only re-
flects a consistent separation of powers vision, but also suggests that a
uniform doctrine governing the domestic status of both treaties and CIL
is not merely emerging but developing. 149 Although the Supreme Court
has yet to note this uniformity-the opinion in Medellin does not so
much as cite Sosa-the parallels between the considerations governing
treaty self-execution and CIL incorporation are apparent. Under this un-
ifying doctrine, neither treaties nor customary international law will au-
tomatically qualify as enforceable domestic law, but treaties will be
more likely to qualify than CIL. 50
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Medellin has predictably
generated debate regarding its significance for the domestic role of trea-
ties. Medellin's import, however, reaches farther than the literature has
acknowledged. The decision diminishes prospects for ATS litigation
based on violations of treaties by undercutting the number of treaties
that may be judicially enforced at the behest of private individuals. The
decision also limits ATS litigation based on breaches of CIL by reduc-
ing the number of treaties that may provide evidence of actionable CIL
norms.
More significantly, Medellin's separation of powers vision lends sup-
port to the claim that the Supreme Court favors the revisionist view of
customary international law. The revisionist view leaves the political
branches to decide the extent to which the federal judiciary may rely on
CIL as a rule of decision. The result is that Medellin directly limits the
domestic role of treaties in U.S. courts and indirectly undermines re-
liance on CIL by the federal judiciary. Equally important, the decision
evidences the development of a uniform doctrine governing the domes-
tic status of both treaties and CIL-a doctrine under which the intent of
the political branches, complemented by considerations of specificity,
mutuality, practical consequences, foreign affairs effects, and alternative
149. See Moore, supra note 4.
150. See id. at 51.
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means of enforcement, informs the domestic legal status of both sources
of international law.
